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Abstract
This article draws on examples of Indigenous conceptu-
alizations of nationhood to question the post-national 
foundation of Judith Butler’s and Rossi Braidotti’s the-
ories of affective subjectivity. The article concludes that 
the responsibility to respect certain political boundaries 
is necessary in fostering non-oppressive affective rela-
tions. 
Résumé
Cet article s’appuie sur des exemples de conceptualisa-
tions autochtones de la notion de nation pour remettre 
en question le fondement post-national des théories de 
la subjectivité affective de Judith Butler et Rossi Braidot-
ti. L’article conclut que la responsabilité de respecter 
certaines limites politiques est nécessaire pour favoriser 
des relations affectives non oppressives.
The recent turn to affect in feminist theory 
and other disciplines has opened up a critical engage-
ment with what constitutes the subject. A critique of 
the bounded, autonomous, rational liberal individual 
within feminist theories is not a novel project nor is 
it confined to feminist theorizing. The turn to affect 
and emotions, however, provides new ways of imagin-
ing subjectivity; it can equally be seen as a productive 
and as a critical project. There is certainly no unified 
feminist voice on this ontological issue; where a the-
orist like Kelly Oliver (2004) draws on Frantz Fanon 
for a feminist anti/post-colonial interpretation of af-
fect, someone else like Teresa Brennan (2004) crosses 
disciplinary boundaries and draws on microbiology 
to understand the borders of the subject. A common 
theme, however, runs through these thinkers; thinking 
about affects and emotions has the effect of disturb-
ing the precarious boundaries between self and oth-
er that have been rigidly enforced in Western liberal 
discourse. It seems that the debates over affect have 
demonstrated the ontological fiction of the atomistic 
individual. Despite the diversity of approaches to af-
fect, one uniting feature is the theorization of subjec-
tivity as relational; interdependence appears to be the 
flipside of atomism.
The turn to theorizing a relational subject 
through affect and emotions has not escaped produc-
tive critique. In this self-reflexive assessment of femi-
nist theory, several theorists (Cvetkovich 2012; Hem-
mings 2012; Pedwell 2012; Pedwell and Whitehead 
2012) have pointed to the potential pitfalls of dehistori-
cization and depoliticization in affect theory. For exam-
ple, Clare Hemmings (2012) warns, “the expectation of 
reciprocity central to empathy risks universalising the 
subject’s experience as a sound basis for engagement 
with others; it ignores the historical and political rea-
sons why others may not be able or not wish to recipro-
cate” (153). Building on this focus on power and affect, 
Carolyn Pedwell (2012) places postcolonialism and 
neoliberalism at the centre of her analysis and Ann Cv-
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etkovich (2012) theorizes “sadness” through the lens 
of racism and colonialism in America. 
 This paper aims to critically assess the dan-
ger of depoliticization and dehistoricization in the 
relational theories of subjectivity presented by Judith 
Butler and Rosi Braidotti. Specifically, I argue that the 
post-national impetus for their two projects is compli-
cated by Indigenous theories of relationality that are 
founded on territorial belonging. Despite clear differ-
ences between the two thinkers—Braidotti focuses on 
affective relationality as an ontological force, where-
as Butler focuses on relationality in terms of human 
emotions—I argue that both thinkers conceptualize 
relational subjectivity—and the boundaries of this 
porous subject—in relation to national boundaries. 
A study of these two thinkers’ conceptualizations of 
the subject is productive because they both justify this 
rethinking of the subject based on economic and po-
litical developments in our present era of globalization 
(Butler 2004a; Braidotti 2006a). Both thinkers diag-
nose the present as a time of both post-nationalism as 
well as xenophobic national resurgence (Butler 2004a, 
39; Braidotti 2006a, 72) and this development requires 
a rethinking of the subject. While Braidotti and Butler 
have many other reasons for pursuing their respective 
projects on affect, the question of national belonging, 
difference, and exclusion is a place of significant con-
vergence in their theories that deserves critical assess-
ment.
 This paper begins with an engagement with 
Indigenous theories of land based collective belong-
ing. Scholars in this field present relational worldviews 
that are, in many ways, compatible with Braidotti 
and Butler’s theories, yet, unlike Butler and Braidot-
ti, their perspectives are not founded on the rejection 
of nationhood. After this introduction to Indigenous 
ways of theorizing relationality and collective belong-
ing, this paper creates a dialogue between Butler and 
Braidotti’s conceptualizations of the subject in light 
of these insights. The origin of the two theories of 
relational subjectivity in Euro-American conceptu-
alizations of the nation-state precludes discussion of 
productive alternative conceptualizations of national 
communities and fluid boundaries. The issue of con-
tinuing colonialism and Indigenous resurgence in 
Canada sheds light on weaknesses in both thinkers’ 
theories of affect—Braidotti risks depoliticizing affec-
tive limits and Butler risks a humanistic universalism 
that does not engage with deep difference with respect 
to non-human materialism—and leads to the conclu-
sion that a productive way forward is to hold elements 
of both theories in tension. The potentially contradic-
tory twinning of the Arendtian political moment in 
Butler with Braidotti’s materialist commitment to the 
productivity of difference is one way for an emanci-
patory feminist/anti-colonial theory of the subject to 
take Indigenous resurgence seriously.
Indigenous Relational Nationhoods: Accountability 
to Relationships1
 Métis feminist scholar Zoe Todd (2014) is one 
of the few scholars who has questioned the relation-
ship between Euro theorizing of relational ontology 
and Indigenous thought. She criticizes these increas-
ingly popular theorists for ignoring “…Indigenous 
thinkers [and] their millennia of engagement with 
sentient environments, with cosmologies that enmesh 
people into complex relationships between themselves 
and all relations” (n.p.). She draws on thinkers such 
as Anishinaabe legal scholar John Borrows to argue 
that these Indigenous worldviews are not simply an 
interesting theoretical alternative to atomistic subjec-
tivity, but rather are the basis of political struggles. She 
writes: “…Indigenous epistemologies and ontologies 
represent legal orders, legal orders through which In-
digenous peoples throughout the world are fighting 
for self-determination, sovereignty” (n.p.). 
 This political fight is visible in recent Indige-
nous resurgence across “Canada” especially as seen in 
the Idle No More Movement. A collection of writings 
from this movement (The Kino-nda-niimi Collective, 
2014) demonstrates that there is no unitary Indige-
nous voice in addressing colonialism, yet the theme of 
Indigenous resurgence—the rebuilding of Indigenous 
ways of life through assertion rather than state dom-
inated negotiation—is a recurrent theme. For many, 
like Tara Williamson (2014), this resurgence is “about 
nationhood. Not nation-state-hood, but nationhood—
the ability to take care of the land, our children, and 
our families in the way we best know how” (153). Sev-
eral other contributors argue that the momentum of 
the Idle No More movement should be directed toward 
the longstanding struggle to assert national self-deter-
mination (The Kino-nda-niimi Collective, 2014).
www.msvu.ca/atlantisAtlantis 37.2 (2), 2016 135
Indigenous conceptualizations of “nation-
hood,” as alluded to above, are not the same as Western 
notions of the nation-state. Indigenous peoples have 
not simply taken up a European concept of national 
self-determination and used it politically, but rather this 
use of nationhood reflects the historical and continuing 
existence of political communities based on the interre-
lation of land, people, and spirituality. In contrast to po-
litical identity founded on grievances and mobilization, 
Indigenous scholars Taiaiake Alfred and Jeff Corntassel 
(2005) provide a concept of Indigenous “peoplehood” 
based on sacred history, language, land, and interrela-
tionship between people and nature (609). This con-
ceptualization does not rely on a static and essentialist 
identity nor does it reduce Indigenous peoplehood to a 
normative identity based solely in resistance.  
 Relationality is one of the core ideas that con-
nect diverse Indigenous nationhoods. Shawn Wilson 
(2008) states that “…the shared aspect of an Indigenous 
ontology and epistemology is relationality (relation-
ships do not merely shape reality, they are reality) (7). 
The importance of relational interconnectedness can be 
seen as a “theoretical framework” that connects various 
Plains First Nations (Cardinal and Hildebrand 2000, 
ix). According to Plains Treaty Elders, their sovereignty 
as nations is rooted in a lived relationship with the Cre-
ator and iyiniw sawêyihtâkosiwin (Cree for the peoples’ 
sacred gifts) (10). Iyiniw sawêyihtâkosiwin includes not 
only the material world, but also laws and values that 
guide relationships (10). The key to maintaining sover-
eign nationhood in this worldview is the Cree concept of 
miyo-wîcêhtowin, meaning “having or possessing good 
relations” (39). These good relations extend from the in-
dividual, through the family, outward to the nation, and 
beyond to inter-national relations. Rather than nation-
al territorial boundaries being a sharp demarcation of 
the political outside, the Cree word wîtaskêwin means 
“living together on the land” and applies to pre-colonial 
territorial sharing with other nations along territorial 
boundaries (39). It is within this framework that Shawn 
Wilson (2008) makes the argument that ethical action is 
based on “relational accountability”—that is, action that 
respects and builds good relations rather than dimin-
ishing them.
 While the specific laws and ceremonies of each 
nation will differ with respect to the ways of building 
nationhood through relations, it appears that relation-
ality is central to Indigenous thought across Turtle Is-
land (D’Arcangelis 2010). Charles Menzies (2013) of the 
Gitxaala Nation of the North Coast writes about three 
central concepts in the Gitxaala worldview that are all 
connected to relationality: “These move from the cen-
tral idea of social relationships (WulE’isk, relative or not 
relative) through the principle of interconnections (syt 
güülm goot, being of one heart) to the idea of continuity 
(nabelgot, reincarnation) (180). Like the Cree concepts 
discussed above, the nation based on relationality does 
not have a fixed outside, but rather attempts to bring 
outside peoples into relations (Menzies 2013). Histori-
cally, white settlers have not been excluded from Indig-
enous nations because of xenophobic nationalism, but 
rather because their actions have harmed relations and 
placed themselves on the outside as wa’ayn—“unhealed 
people” (184). This is an example of settlers acting as if 
they are unaccountable for their relations.
 Nishnaabeg scholar Leanne Simpson (2011) 
explains the difference between Western conceptu-
alizations of nation and sovereignty and Nishnaabeg 
concepts through the idea of change and movement as 
compared to fixity; the attempts to fix the nation in the 
institution of the state is contrary to Indigenous nation-
hood that is tied to the fluctuations of nature (89). She 
further explains that this relational fluidity applies to 
territorial boundaries:
…‘boundaries’, in an Indigenous sense, are about relation-
ships. As someone moves away from the centre of their 
territory—the place they have the strongest and most fa-
miliar bonds and relationships—their knowledge and re-
lationship to the land weakens. This is a boundary, a zone 
of decreasing Nishnaabeg presence…This is a place where 
one needs to practice good relations with neighbouring 
nations. (89)
Importantly for our discussion of Braidotti and Butler, 
odaenauh, according to Elder Basil Johnston, means “na-
tion as an interconnected web of hearts” and this directly 
connects political relations to emotional relations (94).
Indigenous Nationhoods and Gender
Before proceeding to a discussion of Butler and 
Braidotti, it is important to note that just as colonial-
ism is a gendered process, so is national resurgence. 
The appropriation of traditional Indigenous territory 
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in Canada and the spacial containment of First Nations 
on reserves has been intimately linked with sexist In-
dian Act membership rules, restrictive mobility rights 
for Indigenous women, the sexual objectification of In-
digenous women, and institutional indifference to sex-
ual violence against Indigenous women (Silman 1987, 
Lawrence 2004; Smith 2005; Razack 2002; Barman 
1997/1998; Maracle 1996). Given the multigeneration-
al imposition of colonial patriarchy, it is not surprising 
that some Indigenous men—and women—internalized 
these gendered norms and came to see Indigenous fem-
inism as “untraditional and, by extension, as deleterious 
to indigenous liberation” (Green quoted in Coulthard 
2014, 88). Bonita Lawrence (2004) traces how rac-
ist and sexist norms of membership in the Indian Act 
came to be internalized by some Indigenous people in 
the context of state-imposed scarcity of resources. Glen 
Coulthard (2014) provides a concise overview of gender 
discrimination in the struggle for Indigenous self-de-
termination and comes to the conclusion that feminism 
is not the enemy of Indigenous sovereignty; rather, the 
imposition of colonial patriarchy is the real threat to In-
digenous traditions of egalitarianism (92).
As can be seen in the earlier examples of resur-
gent Indigenous nationhoods, the “traditional” is based 
on lived relations and is always in flux; there is no inher-
ent tension between Indigenous nationalisms thus con-
ceived and gender equality. Indeed, the Native Wom-
en’s Association of Canada (2011)—once maligned by 
male-dominated organizations as the enemy of self-de-
termination—has adopted the position that drawing on 
tradition to rebuild nations is key to Indigenous wom-
en’s well-being. It is widely held in Indigenous schol-
arship (Sunseri 2011; Monture-Angus 1999; Lawrence 
2004) that tradition-informed nation-building projects 
are key to decolonizing imposed patriarchal relations. 
Central to these projects is the reclaiming of women’s 
traditional roles as the foundation of Indigenous com-
munities. Though she does not use the language of na-
tion, Jeanette Armstrong (2005) argues that the impo-
sition of a patriarchal family structure on the co-oper-
ative family-clan system is central to colonization and 
cultural genocide. Thus, attempts at decolonization 
should build community organically from the ground 
up in a way that respects women’s roles in promoting 
relationality. Armstrong says: “It is woman who holds 
this power and becomes powerful only when catalyz-
ing co-operation and harmony, and therefore health, 
at all levels–from the individual, outward to the family, 
to the community, and to the environment” (76) Like-
wise, Lina Sunseri (2009) draws on Oneida tradition to 
put forward her conceptualization of anti-patriarchal 
“mothering the nation” as part of a decolonizing pro-
cess. Of central importance is the fact that these concep-
tualizations of community- and nation-building differ 
from exclusionary nation-state formations in the sense 
that they are not founded on a constitutive “othering,” 
but rather on the living process of relationship build-
ing. This resurgence of nation-building is not simply a 
strategic opposition to colonialism, but rather draws on 
pre-colonial tradition and is productive in fostering the 
type of relational subjectivity called for by Butler and 
Braidotti who reject national identity as exclusionary.
A Note on the Settler/Indigenous Binary
In this article, I use the term “settler” to refer 
to all non-Indigenous people in Canada. This should 
not be construed as a levelling of difference nor an ig-
norance of power relations between settler groups. The 
influential piece “Decolonizing Antiracism” by Bonita 
Lawrence and Enakshi Dua (2005) provides one entry 
point into the debate about who and what a settler is. 
The authors argue that, although facing racist exclusion, 
people of colour are in fact settlers and are implicated 
in settler colonialism. They call for scholarly attention 
to be paid to the complex histories that implicate peo-
ple of colour in settler colonialism through exclusion 
of Indigenous peoples in written history and appeals 
to belonging in the dominant body politic. Soon after 
its publication, Nandita Sharma and Cynthia Wright 
(2008/2009) responded to Dua and Lawrence’s position 
with a scathing critique of Indigenous nationalisms as 
well as what Sharma and Wright read as a conflation, in 
the original piece, of migration with settlement. 
This exchange led to a flurry of writing on the 
question of the settler/Indigenous binary and how to 
think of racialized and otherwise marginalized non-In-
digenous people in the process of settler colonialism. 
Many scholars of settler colonialism (Wolfe 2013; Bark-
er 2009; Jafri 2012; Phung 2011; Waziyatawin 2011) have 
defended the binary and its usefulness in understand-
ing historical and current forms of settler colonialism. 
Others have called for an intersectional analysis that 
examines the multiple binaries of settler colonialism, 
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while paying attention to the unique nature of coloni-
zation for Indigenous peoples and the different forms of 
oppression faced by marginalized non-Indigenous peo-
ples (Saranillio 2013). A recurrent theme, even among 
those defending the binary, is a call to understand the 
different ways in which marginalized groups are impli-
cated in settler colonialism; for example, by conflating 
sexual or racial oppression with colonization (Mor-
gensen 2010; Tuck and Yang 2012). When I use the term 
settler, it is a shorthand for this last approach that recog-
nizes that, while all non-Indigenous people in Canada 
are structurally implicated in settler colonialism, they 
are not implicated in the same way. This means that 
different histories, different relations to the state, and 
different relations with Indigenous communities lead to 
different responsibilities to these relations. Regardless, 
the Indigenous theories of relationality suggest that a 
commitment to decolonization requires a responsibility 
for one’s relations and these relations can be understood 
through attention to the specificity of marginalized set-
tler groups’ historical and contemporary relation to set-
tler-colonialism.
The Post-National Impetus for Butler and Braidotti’s 
Relational Subject
 To begin this discussion, it is necessary to ex-
amine the political motivations behind rethinking the 
subject in affective terms and how Butler and Braidot-
ti each understand subjectivity. In Transpositions: On 
Nomadic Ethics, Braidotti (2006a) constructs a cer-
tain understanding of the subject in her formulation 
of a materialist post-humanistic ethics. She states that 
her project is a “radical revision of the subject” who is 
“not unitary and still capable of ethical and political 
accountability” (144). It is a political response to the 
dominance of post-industrial neo-liberalism and the 
technological mediation of the subject (3). The nomad-
ic subject is also made nomadic by geopolitical actors 
in the postmodern era that schizophrenically celebrate 
“free borders,” while shoring up security borders and 
thus enhance the mobility of the privileged at the ex-
pense of marginalized bodies (7). The complexity of 
the postmodern era calls for a conception of the subject 
that is equally complex based on multiple belongings 
rather than on fixed identity (10). The very use of the 
concept “nomadic” points to a detachment from fixed 
territoriality. The nomadic subject can be understood 
primarily as a subject in becoming. Unlike a humanist 
ontology, onto which one could map essential human 
conditions like speech or rational thought, the nomadic 
subject is radically anti-essentialist. Braidotti writes that 
“Nomadic becomings are rather the affirmation of the 
unalterably positive structure of difference, meant as a 
multiple and complex process of transformation, a flux 
of multiple becomings, the play of complexity, or the 
principle of not-One” (145). 
For Braidotti, the question of difference—cen-
tral to her project(s)—arises out of the history of Eu-
ropean fascism and philosophy that takes difference 
as dualistic and as inferring inferiority (Braidotti and 
Butler 1994, 45). Given the influence of this history 
on Braidotti, national difference is read as the gravest 
danger facing Europe in an era of complexity that sees 
both the fragmentation of national identity and its re-
surgence (45). In this context, Braidotti (2006a) sees the 
need for a post-nationalist European identity that cele-
brates multiple belongings and undermines essentialist 
identity (69). Here, we can see the connection between 
relational affective subjectivity and the nation-state in 
her theory; a new theory of subjectivity is needed to ac-
count for the complexities of globalization and increas-
ing incoherence of the nation-state, while simultane-
ously a push for new forms of post-national governance 
is required to enact this subjectivity.
Butler similarly bases her formulation of the 
affective subject on the complexities of a post-nation-
alist world that responds to this uncertainty with reac-
tionary nationalist xenophobia. Butler (2004) argues 
that, after 9/11, the US had its sense of first worldism 
shaken in that America lost its monopoly on being “the 
one who transgresses the sovereign boundaries of other 
states, but never to be in the position of having one’s 
own boundaries transgressed” (39). She hopes that this 
shaken foundation, and the related emotion of grief, 
can allow for critical discussion of vulnerability and the 
possibility of working toward a shared political com-
munity; in contrast, the alternative is violent closure 
and the shoring up of xenophobic boundaries and bor-
ders (30). 
 For Butler, the problem of the nation-state is 
similarly located in the exclusionary nature of the na-
tion. In Precarious Life (Butler 2004a), the problem is 
nationalist xenophobia that renders some lives unin-
telligible, while in Who Sings the Nation-State? (Butler 
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and Spivak 2007), the problem is framed more broadly 
around Hannah Arendt’s critique of the nation-state in 
the context of post-World War II Europe. Butler’s at-
tempt to rehabilitate an open-ended humanism through 
mutual vulnerability and emotional connections can be 
read as an attempt to create a post-national subject: a 
subject with the right to have rights regardless of nation-
ality. Considering the driving force behind her critique 
of nationalism, it is not surprising that Butler comes to 
a similar assessment of nationalism as Braidotti. Butler 
argues forcefully against homogeneous national identi-
ty when she writes: “This is, needless to say, not a reason 
to favour pluralism, but rather, a reason to be suspicious 
of any and all forms of national homogeneity, however 
internally qualified they may be…” (Butler and Spivak 
2007, 41).
The Unbounded Relational Subject in Braidotti and 
Butler
 For Braidotti, the subject comes into being over 
time through the body’s capacity to interact with oth-
ers. It is this element of affect—the body’s ability to af-
fect and be affected by others—that makes subjectivity 
possible. As Braidotti (2006a) writes: “Viewed spatially, 
the post-structuralist subject may appear as fragment-
ed and disunited; on a temporal scale, however, its 
unity is that of a continuing power to synchronize its 
recollections. This creates a continuity of disconnected 
fragments…” (151). Though coming at the question of 
the human subject from a different angle, one of un-
derstanding loss in the context of 9/11, Butler (2004a) 
describes a subject that shares points of contact with 
the nomadic subject; that is, relational inter-depen-
dence provides the conditions that allow for the emer-
gence of a subject.
 The main thrust of Butler’s (2004a) Precarious 
Life is to look at the possibility of a political community 
based on inter-dependence. Through this collection of 
essays, she attempts not to create an ontological cate-
gory of the human through a shared universal human 
condition, but rather to think of a political definition 
of the human as a work in progress. Loss and grieving 
are central to this project because when one experienc-
es loss, the attachment to others comes to the fore in a 
way that exceeds discursive representation. She writes 
that “One finds oneself fallen. One is exhausted but 
does not know why. Something is larger than one’s own 
deliberate plan, one’s own project, one’s own knowing 
and choosing” (21). The outside force that thwarts the 
self-regulating individual is its relationality: the ability 
to affect and be affected by others.   Affectivity is not 
reducible to signifiable emotions like grief, but grief al-
lows intuitive access to the trans-subjective nature of 
affectivity.
 To be clear, Braidotti (2006a) rejects this focus 
on loss and death, characterizing it as the “sterility of 
habit” (40) and argues instead for a reappraisal of the 
vitality of life that is not so obsessed with loss of the self. 
Nevertheless, the drive to transform “resentment into 
affirmation” (208) shares much with Butler’s political 
project of thinking an affectively informed alternative 
to the violent US reaction to the 9/11 attacks. The goal 
is the same: to avoid a reactionary response to pain, one 
should approach pain, and even death, as potentially 
productive in increasing our knowledge of our inter-
dependence. One of the central differences that cuts 
through this shared focus on the transformation of pain 
is that Butler aims to resurrect an open-ended human-
ism, while Braidotti’s (2006a) nomadic subject relies on 
a radical critique of anthropocentrism (97).
 Like Braidotti’s nomadic subject, Butler’s (2004a) 
inter-subject cannot be characterized as a completely 
undifferentiated flux. Temporality plays an important 
role since “Individuation is an accomplishment, not a 
presupposition, and certainly no guarantee” (27). It is 
important to note that this somewhat bounded subject 
is not just the result of developmental individuation, but 
also an effect of political performativity. Butler argues 
that the use of bounded identity categories and rights 
discourse, which privileges the liberal individual, is 
necessary; however, this discourse does not “do justice” 
to the complex affective connections that make us and 
undo us (Butler 24-25). The question, then, is whether 
this is just a pragmatic, strategic consideration or is this 
limit to the undone subject reflective of something more 
essential in the formation of subjects? If it is the case, as 
Butler says, that “It is important to claim that our bod-
ies are in a sense our own and that we are entitled to 
claim rights of autonomy over our bodies” (25), then 
perhaps there is value in claiming bounded identity that 
goes beyond strategic politics. Is there a way of think-
ing about mutual respect of boundaries that, instead 
of excluding and oppressing, is productive in the sense 
of creating the conditions of inter-dependence? Butler 
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(2004b) clarifies her position on norms as they relate to 
political commitments and identities when she writes: 
“On the one hand, norms seem to signal the regulato-
ry or normalizing function of power, but from another 
perspective, norms are precisely what binds individuals 
together, forming the basis of their ethical and political 
claims” (219). For Butler, then, it is not simply a mat-
ter of rejecting bounded identity—normative identity is 
the precondition for political action—rather, one must 
always be aware of the exclusionary nature or these 
identities. The affectively open subject is bounded, in 
Butler’s account, by normative political boundaries that 
are necessary for political action as well as by normative 
boundaries that exclude some from the category “hu-
man,” severing the potential for affective connection. 
 Braidotti (2006a) conceptualizes limits to her 
nomadic subject in a different way through her unique 
use of the concept “sustainability”; this limit is to be 
found in the material realm that some critics see as mar-
ginal in Butler’s thought. Braidotti explains that affec-
tivity can be seen:
In those moments of floating awareness when rational 
control releases its hold, ‘Life’ rushes on towards the sen-
sorial/perceptive apparatus with exceptional vigour. This 
onrush of data, information, affectivity, is the relational 
bond that simultaneously propels the self out of the black 
hole of its atomized isolation and disperses it into a myr-
iad of bits and pieces of data imprinting or impressions. 
It also, however, confirms the singularity of that particular 
entity which both receives and recomposes itself around 
the onrush of data and affects. (145; emphasis mine)
The power of this rush of relationality can be destruc-
tive; thus “One needs to be able to sustain the impact 
with the onrushing affectivity, to ‘hold’ it, without being 
completely overwhelmed by it” (145). 
 One of Braidotti’s (2006a) most interesting takes 
on sustainability is the bodily manifestation of limits. 
She argues that if one reaches a limit of sustainabili-
ty, the body will make the limit clear through somatic 
manifestations (159). Another way of thinking about 
the body’s immersion in affective relationality is “the 
subject’s ability to sustain the shifts without cracking” 
(160). The somatic manifestations of unsustainable af-
fectivity have particular importance for post-colonial 
and feminist theories that show the connection between 
asymmetrical power relations and those who live with 
unsustainable affects. Teresa Brennan (2004), for exam-
ple, shows the ways in which racialized and/or gendered 
subjects face affective “dumping” by privileged groups 
who can maintain their sense of bounded security only 
through projecting negative affects onto others. Ac-
cording to Brennan, this might account for the somat-
ic manifestation of hysteria as a women’s illness (15). 
Furthermore, Kelly Oliver’s (2004) critical engagement 
with Fanon draws attention to the self-destructive man-
ifestations of negative affects in the colonized, which 
originate in the colonizer. 
Limitations of Braidotti’s Ethical Response to Pain 
and Suffering
 An understanding of asymmetrical power rela-
tions reveals something that remains under-theorized 
in Braidotti’s work; if the nomadic subject is fluid and 
contingent, yet maintains borders in order to sustain 
and manage this fluidity, how is it that some subjects 
appear more sovereign and more autonomous than oth-
ers? The appearance of boundedness is always relational, 
and if Brennan (2004) is correct, then white, masculine 
subjects gain their own sense of autonomy by affective-
ly transgressing the porous borders of feminized and 
racialized others. Those benefiting from asymmetrical 
power relations may see this autonomy as a natural as-
pect of human freedom, whereas the epistemic privilege 
of the oppressed may allow this autonomy to appear 
contingent on relations of power.
 This question of asymmetrical power in the 
politics of sustainability has not gone unnoticed by 
otherwise sympathetic critics. For example, Lisa Bara-
itser (2010) asks: “What if a body says ‘I can’t take it 
anymore’, and another body nevertheless continues to 
hurt it?…Does this not push all the responsibility for 
knowing when it’s enough back onto abused bodies…?” 
(129). Similarly, Hemmings (2010, 139) asks: “Are only 
the strong-hearted, the ones who can stand the open-
ness and survive retrospective clarity, the inheritors of 
an ethical future?” (139). Braidotti (2010) does not ad-
equately address these pressing questions; she simply 
responds to them by reiterating the need to transform 
pain and negative affect into ethical—that is, sustain-
able—relationships (140). 
  For Braidotti (2006a), the theoretical basis for 
judging the sustainability, and hence the ethics of an 
www.msvu.ca/atlantisAtlantis 37.2 (2), 2016 140
action, is found in “a fundamental drive to life: a po-
tential” (155); it is this fundamental vitalistic drive that 
is the ultimate good against which to measure oppres-
sion.  Good government, and ethical behaviour, pro-
mote this drive for relational connectivity, while uneth-
ical behaviour hinders this positive freedom of potentia 
(150). Though Braidotti wants to focus on the positivi-
ty of affect, she does not deny that conflict, even violent 
oppression, occurs. It is because of the universality of 
the drive for potentia that these conflicts can be judged 
as oppressive and hence “Because all subjects share in 
this common nature, there is a common ground on 
which to negotiate the interests and the eventual con-
flicts” (157). 
 In her recent introduction to the second edition 
of Nomadic Subjects, Braidotti (2011) clearly engages 
with these questions of asymmetrical power by fram-
ing her broad theoretical project(s) as being driven by 
“the fundamental power differential among categories 
of human and nonhuman travellers or movers” (4). She 
takes care to note that certain bodies are made marginal 
through violence and that these bodies are dispossessed 
of their selves (6). Although Braidotti provides an eth-
ical basis for judging oppressive affective relations as 
wrong—her nomadic ethics of sustainability provides a 
convincing framework for this—it seems that she does 
not live up to her own standard of assessing nomadic 
subjectivity through “historically grounded, socioeco-
nomic references” (4). While Braidotti’s (2006a) discus-
sion of the ethical implications of “sustainability” on the 
discourse of addiction is productive (224), one might 
imagine a more in depth discussion of sustainability 
as it relates to her three axes of alterity: woman/native/
nature. Braidotti gives a nod to Indigenous others, but 
does not deeply engage with Indigenous scholars and 
activists engaged in national resurgence aimed at creat-
ing sustainable relations.
 What is compelling in Butler’s account of power 
and national difference is the attempt to take account 
of affectivity in light of the political construction of na-
tional difference. Her handling of borders and bound-
aries provides a specificity that is lacking in Braidotti’s 
discussion of sustainability. That the US could appear 
bounded and sovereign as a nation-state relies on a 
similar process through which members of privileged 
social groups come to embody (however imperfectly) 
the liberal ideal of the autonomous individual. This is 
a primary concern for Butler (2004a) in Precarious Life 
where she engages with how the human has been vari-
ably constructed in ways that exclude the vulnerability 
of some, making them unreal (33).
 Butler’s theoretical elaboration on the connec-
tion between national borders and affective boundaries 
allows the naming of the political origin of oppressive 
transgression of these boundaries and thus potentially 
political solutions. Braidotti, on the other hand, rejects 
a politics that attempts to avoid pain or seeks redress 
for these transgressions. One of the consequences of 
such an ethics is that violence is not objected to because 
it violates the autonomy of the bounded individual as 
an end in him or herself, but because “the harm you 
do to others is immediately reflected in the harm you 
do to yourself, in terms of loss of potentia, positivity, 
self-awareness and inner freedom” (Braidotti 2006a, 
157). This analysis of relational freedom seems compat-
ible with Indigenous conceptualizations of responsibil-
ity to relations, yet it downplays the political nature of 
resurgence against colonial harm by collapsing avoid-
able political pain with random suffering that flows 
from the chaos of material reality. In “Affirmation Ver-
sus Vulnerability,” Braidotti (2006b) argues that nomad-
ic ethics should not seek to avoid pain, but rather avoid 
the “stultifying effects of passivity” associated with pain 
(242). For Braidotti (2006a), our responsibility to those 
we harm “...calls for recognition, acknowledgement and 
understanding: this is the only ethical freedom we dis-
pose of ” (151). Yet, it remains unclear who is doing the 
recognizing and what conditions are required for recog-
nition. Glen Coulthard (2007) provides a stinging cri-
tique of dominant settler politics of recognition that are 
inherently asymmetrical and that replicate the colonial 
relationship by placing the power to recognize squarely 
with the settler-state. In light of this critique, it seems 
likely that self-assertion of Indigenous national identity 
is one of these conditions for sustainable affective rela-
tions.
Indigenous Nationhoods: Toward a Nuanced Read-
ing of Relational Political Borders
 I want to turn now to the question of Indige-
nous nationhoods in Canada and how it can produc-
tively inform the Euro/American theories of affective 
relationality under discussion. From my location in 
British Columbia, Canada, one of the most pressing po-
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litical issues of the day is the proposed construction of 
liquefied natural gas and bitumen pipelines across In-
digenous territories. Anywhere in the world, these proj-
ect could become a contentious issue of environmental 
sustainability, but in British Columbia—where very few 
treaties between Indigenous nations and Canada have 
been signed, making the land unceded Indigenous terri-
tories—the controversy has become a question of land, 
boundaries, and nationhood. It is a question of who gets 
to cross and transgress boundaries.
 The continuing currency of the concept of In-
digenous nationhood provides grounds for questioning 
the post-national impetus behind Butler and Braidotti’s 
work. Braidotti’s theory grows out of a legitimate con-
cern about fascism and nationalism in Europe, but this 
basis then leads to an ethical theory of relationality that, 
when applied in Canada, severely limits attempts at de-
colonization through Indigenous nation building. What 
might the implications be if Indigenous conceptions of 
nation are given priority? What might this tell us about 
the potentially liberatory potential of national identity 
that is not nomadic, but rather is intimately tied to ter-
ritory and provides an alternative to clearly demarcated 
nation-states constituted on othering?
 While the conceptions of nation discussed 
above challenge the exclusions and boundaries of the 
Western nation-state, this does not mean that they are 
completely unbounded. In returning to the question of 
pipeline development, members of the Unist’ot’en Clan 
of the Wet’suwet’en nation have been actively asserting 
traditional regulation of territorial boundaries. In Au-
gust 2010, hereditary leaders Toghestiy and Hagwilakw 
presented an eagle feather to Enbridge representatives 
as a “first and final” warning of trespass on Wet’suwet’en 
territory (Unist’ot’en Camp, “Trespass Notice” 2010). 
This is in keeping with traditional Wet’suwet’en law that 
requires guests to fully identity themselves, ask per-
mission to enter Wet’suwet’en territory, and be grant-
ed this permission prior to entry (Unist’ot’en Camp, 
“Consent Protocol”). Because of the incursion of settler 
industry onto Unist’ot’en territory, several community 
members have created a camp in the proposed pipeline 
route that they describe as a “gateway (not a blockade)” 
(Unist’ot’en Camp, “Northern Gateway”). This example 
of grassroots assertion of territorial boundaries points 
to one facet of a boundary of responsibility. Settlers—
and non-Wet’suwet’en Indigenous peoples—have a re-
sponsibility to respect the laws of the land so that de-
colonized relationships can be built across boundaries 
and “gateways.” It is crucial to note that this assertion 
of boundary is not the same as wall building; if guests 
are willing to develop good relations, to be responsible, 
they will be welcomed. It is not a fixed characteristic 
of outsiders that makes them outsiders, but rather it is 
their actions as settler developers, their refusal to ac-
knowledge Indigenous title and laws that makes them 
trespassers. 
 Colonialism in Canada is a complex and mul-
tifaceted process that can be partly understood as un-
reciprocated transgression of boundaries. Braidotti’s 
nomadic ethics would suggest that, for members of 
settler society, there is a loss of potentia by continuing 
colonial relations because of a loss of affective connec-
tions with Indigenous peoples. The problem is that for 
most non-Indigenous people in Canada, the status quo 
is working out fairly well. There is very little incentive 
to allow the Crown to negotiate a relationship with In-
digenous nations that would be truly sustainable and 
decolonized as this would require not only significant 
transfer of land wealth, but a complete reconceptual-
ization and questioning of Canadian sovereignty to 
bring it in line with principles of co-existing relational 
sovereignty. Braidotti’s view that the origin of suffering 
cannot be adequately determined and that compensa-
tion is politically futile takes on a colonialist flavour in 
British Columbia where settlers are for the most part 
squatters on Indigenous territory. This is not to say that 
“we”—that is, Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples 
alike–should not work toward transforming pain into 
something productive and figuring out how to live to-
gether. However, settlers must open our eyes to Indige-
nous national resurgence as political action and as po-
litical action that entails responsibility to building good 
relations. It seems that sustainable relational affectivity 
from my location, as a settler, first requires respect of re-
lational boundaries. Political action against settler tres-
passing—especially state supported development with-
out Indigenous consent—as well as action toward pos-
itive settler-Indigenous relation building are two sides 
of the question of responsibility. Respect of boundaries 
does not shut down the type of relational affectivity that 
Braidotti supports, but rather is the precondition for it.
 Butler’s focus on normative political limits to 
affectivity has its own shortcomings when it comes to 
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Indigenous nations. As discussed above, normative 
identity claims are a necessary precondition for politi-
cal action in Butler’s work, but they are also inherently 
exclusionary. However, the initial discussion of Indige-
nous conceptions of nationhood suggests that this po-
litical form is not inherently exclusionary in the same 
way as the nation-state. Butler’s claim that, in the face of 
violent transgression of sovereignty, one can accept vul-
nerability and interdependence or, alternatively, shore 
up xenophobic borders is a false dilemma. Perhaps 
inter-dependence demands a political form like In-
digenous nationhood where good relations with other 
communities are essential to good domestic relations. 
This conceptualization does not rely on a static and es-
sentialist identity nor does it reduce Indigenous people-
hood to a normative identity based solely in resistance. 
Indigenous relational belonging offers theories—pro-
vided by Indigenous scholars—as well as concrete his-
torical examples of political forms that are ignored in 
Butler’s focus on the dangers of the European tradition 
of the nation-state.  
This brings me directly to the question of both 
theorists’ anti/post-nationalism in light of Indigenous 
nationhood. In discussing identity claims, Braidotti 
(2006a) concedes that “feminists, anti-racists and hu-
man rights activists, at this point in history are legit-
imate in pursuing “molar” positions, claiming identi-
ty-centred redefinition of their political subjectivity” 
(154). Given the fact that Braidotti argues for the pro-
ductivity of difference—that is, the others of modernity 
including “natives” provide productive alternative sub-
jectivities—it is better to think of Indigenous nation-
hood not as a “molar” identity, or a strategic norm in 
Butler’s case, but rather as productive difference. For ex-
ample, Anishinaabek legal scholar John Borrows (2010) 
argues that the Anishinaabek belief in a living earth and 
obligations to this earth presents a challenge to the lib-
eral legal tradition in Canada and serves as a productive 
reason for adopting legal pluralism in Canada (249). 
Unlike a reactionary xenophobic nationalism, the rec-
ognition of Indigenous peoplehood is complementary 
to projects that aim to disrupt the autonomous liberal 
subject by highlighting mutual interdependence.
 Despite her ambivalence toward Arendt’s pub-
lic/private distinction, it is Butler’s focus on the polit-
ical as a site of human action that might allow an ad-
equate assessment of non-Indigenous responsibility in 
respecting relational borders. Braidotti’s focus on affec-
tive sustainability risks eliminating the political agency 
required to build sustainable decolonized relationships 
in Canada. That said, Braidotti’s refusal of anthropo-
centrism provides a “European” theory that can respect 
the deep differences between the European nation-state 
and Indigenous nationhood by accepting the interde-
pendence of human, animal, and environment. Once 
again, Indigenous conceptualizations of nationhood 
demonstrate that choosing between political agency 
and a holistic anti-anthropocentrism is a false binary. 
Indigenous nationhood is deeply political, but it does 
not require the human to define itself against an exter-
nal nature. 
 This brief discussion of Indigenous nationhood 
does not show that either Butler or Braidotti is wrong. 
It simply reinforces that they are approaching affect 
from a specific location, which they both acknowledge. 
Likewise, my location is limited, but suggests that these 
two theorists are perhaps too hasty in pursuing post-na-
tional theories of affect. If one reads Braidotti in light of 
the political significance of relational national bound-
aries, the concept of sustainability could be extended to 
include agency against “negative” affects such as pain. 
The ethics of a sustainable nomadism would then also 
require avoidance of pain and an acknowledgement of 
the source of the pain in order to prevent it. This shift 
in thinking requires that, though boundaries are always 
dynamic, ethics involve respecting these boundaries as 
much as it involves understanding the in-betweenness 
that makes these boundaries possible. 
 For Butler, a closer examination of power dy-
namics in her concept of vulnerability is required to ac-
count for the limits of the subject. One might argue that 
a pre-requisite for acknowledging the shared condition 
of vulnerability is a level of respect for the boundaries 
of the corporeal subject, which is intimately linked with 
respect for national boundaries; otherwise, an appeal to 
vulnerability will appear as nothing more than an at-
tempt to conceal the colonial relationship with a false 
universalism. Therefore, the dialogue and coalition-
al politics that Butler borrows from Chandra Mohan-
ty would be as much about recognizing the fluidity of 
identity categories as recognizing the territorial crystal-
lization of these identities in Indigenous nations.
 The implications of Butler and Braidotti’s work 
provide convincing theoretical grounds for rejecting a 
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fully discrete, bounded, and autonomous subject, which 
is usually associated with European liberalism. Howev-
er, their theories also imply that a fully contingent and 
open subject is not only a poor description of the con-
temporary subject, but it is also not a normative ideal. 
If both Butler’s and Braidotti’s diagnoses of a post-na-
tional world require revision in light of the complexities 
of Indigenous nationhoods, then so do their affectively 
constituted subjects. This paper is not the place to begin 
a full development of what this hybrid subjectivity looks 
like, but the cited Indigenous scholars provide an en-
try point into this discussion. Upon initial inspection, 
it appears possible to balance Butler’s focus on the po-
litical and cultural realm with Braidotti’s privileging of 
non-human vitalism. It also appears possible to develop 
a transformative political realm nationally and trans-
nationally, which does not cut off “the human” from 
its environment. My hope is that this engagement has 
demonstrated not only the limits of the location from 
which Butler and Braidotti are theorizing, but also the 
contribution of Indigenous thought on its own terms.  
Endnotes
1 I use the plural ‘nationhoods’ to indicate the varied national tradi-
tions of different First Peoples. This paper offers a cursory view of 
some conceptions of ‘nation’ and political community that should 
not be taken as representative of a homogeneous ‘Indigenous’ worl-
dview. Examples of Oneida and Mohawk national traditions will be 
unique from Wet’suwet’en traditions, yet these diverse examples all 
point to alternate understandings of nation and territory in con-
trast to European traditions.
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